Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship

1996

Consumer Protection Laws of the States: How
Much Diversity Should the Central Government
Discourage? Where Desirable, How Should
Uniformity Be Promoted?
Norman I. Silber
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Norman I. Silber, Consumer Protection Laws of the States: How Much Diversity Should the Central Government Discourage? Where
Desirable, How Should Uniformity Be Promoted? 431 (1996)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/1202

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

42
Consumer Protection Laws of the States:
How Much Diversity Should the Central
Government Discourage? Where Desirable,
How Should Uniformity Be Promoted?

Norman I Silber

THE PARADOX OF THE "EMPIRE WITHIN AN EMPIRE"

At the core of American federalism lies the paradox of lmperium in Jmperio, or
an "empire within an empire. "1 It has been said that without the exercise of
relatively autonomous political power by legislative bodies on at least two
planes of government, there would be no federal system. Without such a
concept, political power would be either centralized or else dispersed in a
confederal fashion. The framers of the Constitution most feared usurpation of
power, not by the federal government, but by the states. James Madison, for
example, expressed the common opinion, based on the experience with the
Articles of Confederation, that
there was less danger of encroachment from the General (federal) government than from
the state government; that the mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made
by the former than if made by the latter. All the examples of other confederacies prove
the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the
members than to usurpations of the federal head. 2

At the core of the American federal system are concurrent powers that
belong to the states, and that are beyond the ability of the federal government to
curtail or displace through preemption. These include the power to tax in the
absence of evidence that a state has imposed a burden on commerce among the
several states; the power to regulate the impact of businesses and individuals on
localities; and the power of state courts to enforce common law rules.
Historically, the states have taken on a first-line role in policing the local
marketplace for signs of fraud and abuse. In recent years, and especially after
the Republican election victory of 1980, states aggressively have pursued the
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enforcement of consumer rights in areas where federal agencies also have
authority. One reason for this state assertiveness is that many federal agencies
no longer have the resources to carry out their responsibilities by themselves.
Another is that states may have stronger laws at their disposal than the federal
government. And the deregulation of health and safety programs, which was
aggressively pursued during the Reagan and Bush administrations, was a goal
not shared by many segments of society, well-reflected in many state political
bodies. Not surprisingly, state agencies often decided to take actions that might
have been taken by previous federal regimes. These trends have been reflected
in increasingly divergent attitudes toward consumer protection taken by state
and federal court systems.
While there has been a trend in favor of increasingly aggressive consumer
protection by the states, there also has been a countervailing trend at work: a
sharp increase in federal preemptive action. Many recently enacted federal laws
express provisions for "total," or "complete," federal preemption (although
there are many kinds of "totality").
Political scientists and legal scholars have identified various types of
"complete" federal preemption. 3 These types include (1) laws that repudiate
state financial or administrative assistance to the federal government in
implementing a regulatory regime but depend on interpretations and legal
definitions in significant respects; (2) laws that forbid states from establishing
economic regulations; (3) laws that forbid individuals from discriminating on
particular grounds but that reserve the right to discriminate to government
entities; (4) federal laws incorporating state and local assistance; (5) laws that
preempt the states from regulating but that allow states to regulate their own
activities; (6) limited regulatory turnbacks that allow federal authorities to
delegate certain authorities to the states; (7) mandates to states to enact parallel
state laws; and (8) requirements that states must comply with federal laws in
the enactment of state laws.
Let me provide a few examples of such preemptive rules. The Flammable
Fabrics Act stipulates that "this Act is intended to supersede any law of any
State or political subdivision thereof inconsistent with its provisions. 114
Similarly, the U.S. Grain Standards Act5 forbids states or political subdivisions
to require "inspection or description in accordance with any standards of kind,
class, quality, condition or other characteristics of grain as a condition of
shipment, or sale, of such grain in interstate or foreign commerce, or require
any license for, or impose any other restrictions upon, the performance of any
official's inspection function under the Act by official inspection personnel. 116
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act7 forbids state and local
governments "to establish . . . any standard which is applicable to the same
aspect of the performance of such product and which is not identical to the
federal standard. 118 At the state level, laws continue to be passed that serve local
needs, but whose subjects touch on federally regulated fields. 9
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And so the state "empires" are being confined by federal action. The
increasingly aggressive conswner protection activities of the states have been
confronted, and increassingly thwarted, by preemptive provisions of federal
laws. Challenges based on explicit preemption provisions, and on doctrines that
assert preemption by implication, are being levied against state conswner
protection laws and state common law causes of action. In fact, as indicated
below, states are now being encouraged to express the inclination to be
preempted by federal laws within their own state regulations and administrative
decrees. 10 It falls to the courts to determine where the appropriate limits of
federal preemption are to be drawn to determine how far each empire may
extend.
Consider, in this context, several illustrations of the development of case
law with respect to the preemption of state law and state common law rights of
action.

PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS BY FEDERAL LAWS
AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS: FOOD LABELING

There exist, and have existed for a long time, extensive federal regulations
affecting the marketing of food and food products. Some of the federal statutes
that regulate food labeling contain specific preemption language-principally
the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 11 the Poultry Products Inspection
Act, 12 and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act. 13 Others, such as the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 14 contain no specific language. Nevertheless,
the states have continued to legislate in the area of food packaging and food
labeling.
The touchstone case for any discussion of preemption in the food labeling
area is Jones v. Rath Packing Co. 15 In Jones, a meatpacker sought to prevent a
California county director of weights and measures from removing from stores
packages of bacon that the California director declared to be underweight. 16
The Supreme Court held that, as applied to packaged bacon that was subject to
the labeling requirements of the FMIA, a state's weight labeling statute and
duly promulgated regulations were preempted by federal law. The Court began
its analysis by observing that, when the area sought to be preempted has been
"traditionally occupied by the states, we start with the asswnption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act. 1117 For preemption to occur, the Court held, such a result must have been
"the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 18 This asswnption was intended
to assure that "'the federal-state balance' will not be disturbed unintentionally
by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts. 1119 Thus, Congress must intend,
either explicitly or impliedly, that federal legislation preempt conflicting state
law.
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When there is no clear expression of Congress' intent to preempt,
preemption may still occur if Congress has impliedly expressed an intent to
preempt state law. Such an intent may be implied if Congress (1) occupies the
field of law, leaving no room for state law to coexist, or (2) by creating an
actual conflict between state and federal law. The latter is accomplished when
(a) Congress makes compliance with both the state and federal laws impossible,
or (b) state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment or execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress under the federal law. 20
The Court in Rath Packing Co. held that state statutes and regulations that
did not allow for reasonable variations from stated weight, resulting from loss
of moisture during the course of good distribution practices, were in actual
conflict with the federal FMIA. 21 The Court explained that FMIA, in defining
when meat or a meat product was misbranded, provided that "reasonable
variations" between the actual weight and the weight stated on the label could
be permitted by regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture, and the
Secretary's regulations did, in fact, permit "[r]easonable variations caused by
loss or gain of moisture during the course of good distribution practices or by
unavoidable deviations in good manufacturing practice[s]. 1122 The federal law
prohibited the states from imposing labeling or packaging requirements
"different than" those imposed under the act. 23 The Court noted that the state
law implicitly allowed for variations from the stated weight caused by
unavoidable deviations in the manufacturing process by its use of a statistical
sampling process. Nevertheless, the state law failed to allow for moisture loss
and so was "different than" the federal requirement, thus, falling within the
scope of the federal preemption provision.
In 1985 a grocery manufacturers' association brought an action against the
enforcement of a New York regulatory scheme. 24 The state scheme required
anyone who sold prepared foods containing cheese "alternatives," whether for
carry-out or for consumption on the premises, to display a sign that disclosed,
in three-inch letters, those foods that contained "imitation cheese," and other
specific packaging labels. Nowhere in the FMIA or the FDCA was the word
"imitation" defined. The Department of Agriculture contended that a nutritionally superior food substitute would be misbranded under the state law
because of an FDCA regulation, 25 which provided that the word "imitation"
must only be used with respect to a nutritionally inferior substitute. The court
found that there was actual conflict between the New York labeling scheme and
its federal counterpart. Since including the term "imitation" on the label of a
nutritionally superior alternative cheese in order to comply with New York law
would render the product misbranded under federal law (FDCA), actual conflict
existed between the two regulatory schemes. 26 The court stressed that, in
concurrent enforcement of a law, a state will not be permitted to prevent the
distribution in commerce of any article that conformed to the definition and
standard of identity or composition set by the federal act. The court, thus, by
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summary judgment, concluded that the Poultry Products Inspection Act27
preempted New York laws.
The congressionally declared goal of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act28
is that packages and their labels should allow consumers to obtain accurate
information about the quantity and the contents of goods and facilitate comparisons ofvalue. 29 Section 1461 of the act provides that it is the express intent
of Congress to supersede less stringent state laws relating to the net quantity of
contents of consumer commodities, as well as those that require different
information from the requirements of the act. In L & L Started Pullets, Inc. v.
Gourdine, 30 the court held that city and state regulations involving the labeling
of egg weights and measures were not preempted by the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act or other laws because that was not Congress' intent. The court
relied on the "presumption" against finding congressional intent to preempt
where the specific subject of regulation has traditionally been delegated to the
states "as within their legitimate police powers."31
On the other hand, consider the recent case of Lever Bros. Co. v. Maurer, 32
in which a manufacturer of dairy products successfully enjoined the enforcement of a state statute that prohibited the use in a product label of the word
"BUTTER." The court held that since federal law required that a product label
must include the ingredients contained in a product, it would be impossible to
comply with both state and federal laws. Again the state law was preempted by
federal laws under the supremacy clause. 33
The increasing success of federal preemption claims diminishes the range
and intensity of state protective activity without ensuring that the federal
activity will replace that state activity which had been foregone. Recent
conflicts between the state and federal levels of government over food labeling,
in particular, show signs of further reducing the realm of state activities. After
more than a decade in which the federal government has been inactive with
respect to the establishment of labeling requirements, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Federal Trade
Commission have begun to develop new regulations that would dramatically
change nutritional labeling requirements for many foods. These regulations
would also regulate the marketing of environmental marketing claims-by
providing minimum standards, for example, for such words as "recyclable" or
"biodegradable. 1134 This federal activity may be attributed, at least in part, to the
fact that manufacturers have expressed some dismay at the profusion of state
and local laws that provide different definitions for these and other terms. This
suggests a sensible desire to increase marketing predictability and uniformity of
regulating laws. It also threatens to cut back on state policing initiatives,
however, since most of the proposals for these regulations would involve strong
preemption provisions that would have the federal regulations supersede state
and local laws. 35
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THE IMPLICIT PREEMPTION OF COMMON LAW
TORT REMEDIES: CIGARETTES AND AIRBAGS
Cigarettes

. A great deal of attention has attended the tort claims brought by smokers
against cigarette manufacturers. The most publicized claim was that of Rose
and Antonio Cipollone, who charged three cigarette manufacturers with failing
to adequately warn them of the risks of smoking and with producing an
unreasonably dangerous product. 36 The Cipollones' claim was opposed by
cigarette manufacturers, who claimed that the 1965 federal Cigarette Act, 37
which prescribed uniform warning labels for cigarette packages and
advertisements, preempted any state tort law claims relating to smoking and
health that would seek to challenge the adequacy of those warning labels. 38
Initially, the content and sufficiency of cigarette warning labels were left to the
individual states to define. However, after the states passed numerous different
warning labels that were to be placed on cigarettes sold within each of their
different jurisdictions, Congress created a single federal warning label scheme
with its enactment of the 1965 Cigarette Act. Through the Cigarette Act,
Congress dictated the specific wording of a cigarette label intended to warn
consumers of the product's health hazards and created a uniform standard. The
act included this congressional declaration of policy and purpose:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a
comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby (1) the public may be
adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a
warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and (2) commerce and the national
economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared
policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing labeling and
advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health. 39

Nowhere does the Cigarette Act state specifically that state court actions are
barred. 40 The Cigarette Act also contains a preemption proyision that states:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by
section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 41

Despite the absence of express preemption language, the courts in cigarette
preemption cases have taken the view that, under an "implied preemption"
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analysis, which asks whether state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress, 42 by "disrupting excessively"
the balance of interests established by Congress. That is, that the suits against
the cigarette manufacturers and distributors upset the Cigarette Act's balance
between the protection of health and the protection of trade and the national
economy. 43 This position was first assumed in 1986 by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals44 and subsequently upheld by at least three other courts of appeal
and two state appellate courts. 45

Airbags
The question of whether common law tort actions can be preempted by
federal laws in the absence of explicit preemption language has expanded from
cigarette litigation to airbag litigation. Recent circuit court decisions suggest
that manufacturers are successfully raising the preemption defense in other
types of product liability, design defect actions, related to the absence of airbags
in cars. 46 Safety standards adopted pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 47 as subsequently amended, provide manufacturers
with options for complying with occupant crash protection standards, of which
airbags in conjunction with seatbelts is only one. 48 The issue is whether a
manufacturer who chooses one of these options and meets all of its requirements thereby is free from tort liability. 49 The inquiry in these cases has been
whether Congress intended to prevent all further state action concerning safety
restraints in automobiles by giving manufacturers these options; in essence,
whether Congress intended to preempt state tort law claims.
In 1968 the Eighth Circuit decided that Congress intended the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to be an addition to the common law of
negligence and product liability and not a replacement for it. 50 Therefore,
plaintiffs could maintain state tort actions under the 1966 law. 51 Several recent
court decisions, however, have held that the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act preempts a consumer's ability to maintain a state common
law design action against an automobile manufacturer for failing to install an
airbag in its products. 52 As the First Circuit viewed it,
Congress believed that for the federal standards to be effective, they had to be wrifonn
throughout the country. . . . A state regulation requiring passive restraints would be
expressly preempted because it would destroy the wriformity of the federal standard....
By the same token, a defective design action which, if successful, effectively would
likewise destroy the national wriformity of the federal standard and exceed the state's
authority. 53

The opposing view, expressed recently in Garret v. Ford Motor Co., 54 relies on
cases such as Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 55 to support the proposition that a
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jury award of damages is not a form of state regulation, that damage awards for
failure to install airbags are not a form of state regulation, and that "damage
suits will tend to encourage safety, not countervail it." From this perspective,
state tort law claims should not be preempted because, while they do not
encourage uniformity, they do achieve Congress' goals of more safely designed

cars.
PREEMPTION BY STATE INVITATION:
CONSUMER BANKING SERVICES

Suppose you are a state legislator presented with the latest version of
Revised Articles III and IV by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the America Law Institute, which is concerned with
negotiable instruments and bank collections. 56 Among the earliest sections you
encounter is Section 3-102(c), 57 which delineates the following relationship
between federal and state law: "Regulations of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and operating circulars of the Federal Reserve Banks
supersede any inconsistent provisions of this Article to the extent of the
inconsistency. "58
This preemption language sounds familiar enough and, indeed, similar
preemption clauses exist in many federal banking enactments. Perhaps the only
unusual aspect of the ·language itself lies in its inclusion of "operating
circulars," in addition to regulations, as administrative declarations that
preempt state law. Regulations of the Federal Reserve Board have the effect of
statutory law and, as we have already seen, may preempt inconsistent state
law. 59
Operating circulars, however, are not developed and promulgated according
to the administrative processes and procedures that normally lend legitimacy to
federal regulations. 6 Federal Reserve Banks develop operating circulars pursuant to authority either granted by the Federal Reserve Act or delegated
through a Federal Reserve regulation. 61 When operating circulars are uniform
for all Reserve Banks, as are the majority, the individual Reserve Banks themselves draft the language of the operating circular, which is then submitted to
the Federal Reserve Board, which adopts the operating circuiar, presumably in
the same way it would a regulation. 62 The same procedural standards,
including procedures for public notice and comment, which are met by the
Federal Reserve Board when it promulgates regulations, apparently are not met
when operating circulars are developed. 63
It is not only the language of the preemption provision that is unusual; it is
also the plane of government at which the provision has been located. This
particular preemption provision is located within a body of state law. Why
should a state legislator adopt a state law that reifies federal preemption of
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essentially the same subject matter-negotiable instruments law-that has not
previously been wholly occupied by federal law? It is possible that, since the
drafters' goal is to create uniformity and predictability in commercial transactions, and since banking law has become increasingly national in scope, a
state would contain within it interest groups that would welcome one uniform
rule in preference to nonuniform state rules, however advantageous particular
divergent rules otherwise might be. Any such intent is not compellingly
expressed in the statute or indicated by its comments-and if it were so
expressed might generate controversy.
Explicit preemption provisions contained within federal legislation and
regulations provide courts and regulators with valuable guidance about
legislative or administrative intentions to preempt. What incentive is there,
however, for a state to issue a written declaration and "invitation" to a federal
regulatory body to exercise a maximum level of federal supersession over a
broad area of law that is "traditionally the province" of the states? It might be
argued that after a state has adopted such a preemption provision, preemption
determinations will still be made under the same traditional preemption
analysis outlined above. The very fact that the state has adopted such a
preemption provision, however, will be strong evidence of the states' intent to
be preempted.
The problem I refer to will arise when courts are asked to address the
preemption by a federal regulation or operating circular of a state law related to
Article III. A court so challenged reasonably may assume that the state
intended to be preempted because, in adopting the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), the state could have chosen not to adopt any such preemption provision.
A court might conclude, in its choice of a preemption provision, that the state
adopted a highly restrictive provision. 64 Beyond the effect on courts that
determine preemption under a standard analysis, consider the "chilling" effect
such a provision may have on state consumer initiatives. Adopting such a
provision may well provide a disincentive to states contemplating the adoption
of their own legislation in areas where the provision might intrude. 65

THE CORROSIVE EFFECT OF "COMPLETE" PREEMPTION

The doctrine of preemption is complex and unsettled. What does appear,
however, is a trend toward the inclusion of explicit federal preemption
provisions that confine areas of governance in domains formerly the traditional
province of the states. Although there have been instances in which states have
invited preemption, driven by a presumable need for uniformity, those
situations are exceptional. On the whole, state governors and activists have
resisted the preemption of what had previously been exclusively state activities.
This resistance to preemption has been especially vigorous with respect to
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consumer protection laws. Local consumer groups often have lobbied for their
own states to better protect consumer interests and have obtained significant
consumer protection measures or won higher consumer protection thresholds
through court decisions. In the cases considered here, however, it has been just
when local consumer groups have made these substantial gains that local
companies and businesses have lobbied Congress to obtain complete
preemption by enacting a "uniform" standard.66
If and when such uniform standards are adopted through a total preemption
approach, state interests may be damaged. The vitality of the state governments
may be diminished, individual state innovation may be stifled, and popular
resentment may be sparked by local consumer groups. The tension between
federal and state governments, furthermore, creates conflicts that serve to
corrode federalism and that, in turn, erodes political safeguards that federalism,
at least in theory, seeks to protect and to maintain.
As demonstrated above, uniformity appears to be the chief benefit out of
such a "complete preemption" arrangement-and the advantages to uniformity,
both for businesses and consumers, should not be minimized. However, if
uniformity sufficient to achieve national goals can be accomplished without
total preemption of state consumer protection laws, much would be gained. It
appears to me that there are several uniformity-promoting solutions, short of
total preemption provisions, that should be considered. Here I will mention two.
Interstate compacts and regional agreements can be used to foster uniformity
without federal involvement. And perhaps the most notably successful
American approach to achieving uniformity without federalization, which
began almost a century ago, has been the encouragement of model legislation
proposed for adoption in each state: Model Rules, and Uniform State Laws.

INTERSTATE COMPACTS, MODEL LAWS, AND UNIFORM CODES:
MINIMIZING THE STATE-FEDERAL CONFLICT

Professor Jonathan R Macey recently observed that, in the abstract, the
concept of federalism is a "revered sacred cow"-politicians shout the virtues of
state autonomy whenever deference to the states happens to serve their political
needs, yet "are quick to wield the power of the supremacy clause whenever a
single national rule in a particular area furthers their political interests. 1167
Politically, the incentives for federal lawmakers and state lawmakers to desire
either to defer to, or preempt, legislation promulgated at another level are
continually shifting as the political landscape changes. On occasions, the states
have attempted to forestall federal preemptive action by promoting the adoption
of uniform state laws and entering into interstate compacts, creating agencies
with powers to solve problems. An example of the unsuccessful effort of the
latter nature is the Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Compact, which
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was entered into by Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York in 1967 subsequent to President Lyndon B. Johnson's message to Congress on air pollution,
recommending federal preemption no responsibility for air pollution abatement.
Congress did not grant its consent to the use of the interstate compact.
One way that the states have preserved their autonomy while achieving a
degree of uniformity not otherwise obtainable has been through two
institutions: the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
established in 1891, and the American Law Institute established in 1923. These
two groups are responsible for the development and promulgation of model
rules and uniform state laws. The UCC is prepared by the American Law
Institute (ALI) in CQoperation with the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. The initial drafting of the uniform laws is
accomplished by practicing lawyers and legal teachers in the particular field or
area oflaw, under the supervision of the ALI and the commissioners.
Model rules (for example, the Model Penal Code) and uniform legislation
(for example, the Uniform Commercial Code) have approached the goal of a
uniform interpretation of the law without resort to federal legislation. Where
the goals of uniformity arise from concern that an individual state's legislation
can be defeated through the application of conflict of law rules in federal
litigation, or when the interest in an essentially uniform national law is great,
it may be sufficient to adopt such an approach instead of adopting a federal
rule.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides an excellent example of uniform
laws approach; the Model Penal Code provides an example of the model law
approach. Model laws may serve other, seemingly secondary, functions as well
as providing uniformity. The Model Penal Code (MPC), for example, is far
more complete than any state legislation. In this instance, model laws serve a
notice-giving function; what is a crime in one state would be a crime in any
other state that had adopted the MPC. 68

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

I am not familiar with the faw of the Soviet Union. It would appear,
however, that the problems of the "empire within an empire" are particularly
troublesome at this moment in history. The very idea of "total preemption" by
the central authority may be out of the realm of possibility. In such an
environment, the use of a model law or a uniform law approach may prove to
be worth considering.
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